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Legal Risks of Owning Cryptocurrencies 
 
Kelvin FK Low and Ernie Teo** 
 
ABSTRACT 
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin have matured from being associated exclusively with techies 
and radicals to being considered by central banks as a technology to implement digital 
money. Cryptocurrencies exist only in digital form and can be transferred completely 
between digital addresses. This is both unlike conventional electronic money as 
understood by laypersons which acts as a debt claim on a deposit with a trusted financial 
institution such as a private bank and unlike conventional corporeal money which may be 
physically possessed. This means that any legal rights associated with holding 
cryptocurrencies must be different despite it being remaining open to interpretation. In 
this chapter, we look at the various treatments of money in the legal sense and discuss the 
risks associated with each by drawing on real life examples. We conclude that fraud through 
hacking could potentially pose a problem to widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies as 
the absence of recourse against a third party such as a bank concentrates risk in holders of 
cryptocurrencies. Users should thus exercise caution and understand the risks before 
investing in cryptocurrencies. This warning requires emphasis as many parties 
misapprehend the cryptography within the technology as protecting them from such fraud 
when in fact it does no such thing. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 18 July 2016, economists at the Bank of England published a research paper studying 
the macroeconomic consequences of issuing central bank digital currencies. 1  The 
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following day, The Wall Street Journal gave an account of the study under the headline 
‘The Central Bankers’ Bold New Idea: Print Bitcoins’,2 making a connection between the 
idea of a central bank digital currency to Bitcoin, the original cryptocurrency conceived 
by the mysterious3 Satoshi Nakamoto.4 One week later, in a column lauding the benefits 
of electronic money, a Financial Times columnist astutely observed that the report had 
mistakenly conflated two quite distinct questions: 5  ‘One is whether individuals and 
companies should have access to electronic cash that is official money (in essence, claims 
on the central bank) rather than private money (as in today, claims on private banks, or 
non-bank private claims, as in bitcoin). The other question is whether official e-money 
should be implemented by central banks’ adopting bitcoin-style technology (so-called 
“distributed ledgers” where a network of computers verifies transactions and holdings) 
or as it is today, through centralised registers held by the money issuers.’ From an 
economics perspective, the distinction drawn by the Financial Times may perhaps be 
correct. However, as a matter of legal analysis (and perhaps more importantly, the risks 
associated with the legal analysis), the classification between official money and private 
money needs to be more carefully examined. This is because the different forms of money, 
broadly defined, expose their holders to different risks depending on their legal nature. 
 
2. MONEY BEFORE BITCOINS 
                                                        
Bank of England is not alone in exploring such an initiative. See also Philip Stafford (17 June 
2016), “Canada Experiments with Digital Dollar on Blockchain”, Financial Times; Stan Higgins (20 
January 2016), “China’s Central Bank Discusses Digital Currency Launch”, CoinDesk 
http://www.coindesk.com/peoples-bank-of-china-discusses-plans-to-issue-digital-currency/ 
Retrieved 1 August 2016. 
2 Jon Sindreu (19 July 2016), “The Central Bankers’ Bold New Idea: Print Bitcoins”, The Wall Street 
Journal. 
3 The true identity of Satoshi Nakamoto has been much speculated but remains unknown. See, eg, 
Robert McMillan (7 March 2014), “Why Bitcoin Doesn’t Want a Real Satoshi Nakamoto”, The 
Wired; Izabella Kaminska (7 May 2016), “Bitcoin: Identity Crisis”, Financial Times; Andrew 
O’Hagan (30 June 2016), “The Satoshi Affair”, London Review of Books.   
4  Satoshi Nakamoto (October 2008), “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf Retrieved 14 March 2016. 
5 Martin Sandbh (26 July 2016), “Free Lunch: Electronic Money is a Public Good”, Financial Times. 
 Since we are proposing to analyse the consequences (in terms of risks) of a legal 
classification, it is necessary to ground our study in a particular legal system. For our 
purposes, we will do so with reference to the English common law.6 The absolute core 
instances of money, of which there can be no controversy, are of course corporeal 
money.7 In England, this takes the form of metallic coins issued by the Royal Mint and 
banknotes issued by the Bank of England. Historically, metallic coins are the earliest form 
of money asset still in use today.8 The standard weights and composition of coinage, as 
well as the amount of debt for which they pass as legal tender,9 is today regulated by the 
Coinage Act 1971.10 The other indisputable form of money takes the form of banknotes 
issued by the Bank of England. Banknotes take the form of promissory notes that are 
made payable to bearer. They were part of a group of property known as documentary 
intangibles in which the paper form embodies a legally enforceable promise to pay. They 
were considered documentary intangibles because the promise to pay is regarded by the 
English common law as a form of intangible property, also known as a chose in action,11 
but the law regarded the promise as being embodied in a corporeal, documentary form. 
Today, the promise is primarily symbolic rather than real, the right of a holder of 
banknote to redeem it for payment in metallic coin having been abolished in 1914.12 
While they continue to take the form of promissory notes payable on demand by the 
bearer, ‘a banknote presented for payment at the offices of the Bank of England would 
                                                        
6 This decision is in very large part the result of the availability of an excellent modern treatise 
examining money from the perspective of English private law by David Fox, Property Rights in 
Money (2008). While some or even most of our analysis may apply to other legal systems, 
particularly common law systems derived from English law, the jurisdictional nature of law as a 
discipline means that there will inevitably be variations in analysis.  
7 Cf David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 16. 
8 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 10. 
9 The definition of tender is irrelevant for our purposes. Readers who are interested should refer 
to David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 28. 
10 Coinage Act 1971, ss 2, 6 and 7.  
11 Chose being French for thing. 
12 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 47. 
nowadays only entitle the bearer to be paid an equivalent amount of notes in a different 
denomination.’13 They are therefore effectively pure fiat money.  
 
Somewhat more controversial is the place of incorporeal assets as property, in large part 
because of the Roman classification of legal rights into rights in rem and rights in 
personam. ‘If the argument [against treating incorporeal assets as property] were correct, 
it would drive a wedge through any unified treatment of money since it would require an 
entirely different explanation of money in its corporeal and incorporeal forms.’14 This is 
particularly significant because the ‘de-physicalization’ of money is a very real 
phenomenon. In 2011, corporeal money in the form of coins and banknotes amounted to 
only about 3.6% of the British economy.15 In Sweden, not only has the ratio of corporeal 
money to deposits held at banks and other financial institutions been diminishing, the 
amount of actual corporeal money in circulation appears to have shrunk in a 
phenomenon christened ‘peak cash’. 16  Whilst it is probably premature to write off 
corporeal money as outdated, 17  incorporeal money 18  in the form of bank deposits 
therefore is indisputably gaining in economic significance. The question whether such 
bank deposits are also properly regarded as money and whether there is property in bank 
money is somewhat trickier. This is because:19  
[i]n legal terms, incorporeal money consists in the customer’s legal right to enforce 
the chose in action entitling him or her to draw upon the credit balance with the 
bank or any overdraft facility, or to instruct the bank to make payments from the 
                                                        
13 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 47. 
14 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 34. 
15 Micahel Burda and Charles Wypolz, Macroeconomics: a European Text (6th edn, Oxford, 2013), 
207. 
16 Editorial (24 August 2015), The Case for Retiring Another ‘Barbarous Relic’, Financial Times. 
See also JP Koning (26 February 2015), Sweden and Peak Cash, Moneyness: the Blog of JP Koning. 
17 See The Cambridge Security Initiative, Cash is King – The Digital Revolution: The Future of Cash 
(2016). According to the Chief Cashier of the Bank of England, ‘Cash is now used in 52% of UK 
transactions.’ (at 5) This is a measure of volume, not value. 
18 This is the generic expression coined by David Fox comparable to the expression ‘bank money’ 
found in economic writings: see David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 11. 
19 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 12. 
fund in his or her account as his or her agent. … Incorporeal money is therefore a 
claim to be paid money in primary corporeal form, even though in all likelihood the 
customer will rarely seek to reduce his or her claim to payment in coins. The 
customer’s transferable balances on the account become media of exchange in their 
own right. 
While economists distinguish between different grades of bank money, we can gloss over 
these quite cursorily since we are primarily concerned with the risks arising out of the 
legal classification of money. Thus, classifications by economists according to their 
liquidity and yield into M1, M2 and M3 grades are not significant for our purposes.20 For 
the purposes of this paper, it is also unnecessary to consider in detail whether such bank 
money is properly regarded as property as a matter of legal classification. 21  This is 
because we are primarily concerned with risks arising out of holding particular assets, 
whether they are regarded as property (however defined).  
 
However, without analysing the issue in too much detail, it suffices to observe that choses 
in action, whether they take the form of bank debts (money) or otherwise (non-money), 
have traditionally been regarded as property under English law. 22  The rejection of 
incorporeal assets as property is largely premised upon an artificial distinction drawn 
between rights in rem (rights in relation to things) and rights in personam (rights against 
persons). The former is said to comprise the law of property whereas the latter comprises 
the law of obligations. Fox rightly criticises the distinction as artificial.23 One of the chief 
proponents of this Roman classificatory system in English law, the late Professor Birks, 
conceded that ‘the subdivision of rights between in rem and in personam is not exhaustive 
… The category which is omitted is the category of rights which are good against all people 
                                                        
20 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 17-18. See also Michael Burda and Charles Wypolz, 
Macroeconomics: a European Text (6th edn, Oxford, 2013), 206-14.  
21 Our forthcoming paper, “Bitcoins as Property?”, considers both this question as well as the 
question of how cryptocurrencies would conceivably fit within a broadly defined property 
regime. 
22 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England Volume 2 of the Rights of Things 
(Clarendon Press 1765–69), 442. 
23 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 34-8. 
but do not follow any res. All of these are superstructural rights …’ 24  This view of 
property, as one of us has previously observed, requiring as it does near universal 
enforceability of a right, confuses exclusivity with exigibility.25  
 
This is not to say that the Roman classificatory system is wholly without value. Whilst it 
may be an outmoded means of identifying property in the digital age, it is ironically a very 
useful starting point for our identification of risks inherent in different forms of legal 
rights. We begin with the two different forms of money before the advent of 
cryptocurrencies. While we agree with Fox that they are both properly regarded as 
property, they happen to fall on either side of the Roman classificatory divide. Rights to 
corporeal money are protected by the law through in rem rights.26 Rights to incorporeal 
money are debts owing by the relevant financial institution27 and hence indisputably 
protected as in personam rights. In terms consistent with the Roman classification, the 
difference may crudely28 be described as the distinction between owning something (in 
the case of corporeal money) and being owed something (in the case of incorporeal 
money). This exposes holders of corporeal money to completely different risks from 
                                                        
24 Peter Birks, English Private Law Vol 1 (2000), xxxviii. The late Professor attempts to salvage the 
Roman classificatory system by suggesting that it is perhaps exhaustive of ‘rights realizable in 
court’.  Birks opines, at xxxix: “Thus the right to bodily integrity is protected through the torts 
which are committed against the body, and the right to reputation is protected by the torts of 
defamation. Such primary rights are ‘superstructural’ in that they provide the superstructure 
over the wrong: every wrong is the infringement of a primary right.” However, this cannot be 
correct. Superstructural rights are realizable in court through the grant of an injunction 
protecting the primary right. 
25  Kelvin F K Low and Jolene Lin, ‘Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, 
TragiCO2medy?’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 377, 388-9. 
26 Ignoring for present purposes the token right, almost never exercised, by a holder to compel 
the issuing bank of a banknote by action to pay him or her an equivalent value of notes of a smaller 
denomination. 
27 Foley v Hill (1848) HLC 28. 
28 While this may be inconsistent with the wider definition of property earlier proposed, 
the Roman classification is better suited to our understanding of risk arising out of the 
differing nature of the rights.  
those holding incorporeal money. The object of this paper is to demonstrate starkly the 
different risks that stem from holding different forms of money but before we begin in 
earnest, we must emphasise that risk is unavoidable.  This is the case even with respect 
to cryptocurrencies, which came to be popularised in part because of the vaunted security 
of their ledgers. Some of these risks stem from fraud and it bears reminder that, in 
relation to a different attempt to set up a definitive register of rights (in this case land), 
the learned Starke J remarked that ‘[n]o definition of fraud can be attempted, so various 
are its forms and methods.’29 The enactment of the Fraud Act 200630 in the UK can also 
be seen as an acknowledgement of the boundless creativity of the criminal mind. As the 
Law Commission remarked in its Report that led to the reform: ‘A general offence of fraud 
would be aimed at encompassing fraud in all its forms. It would not focus on particular 
ways or means of committing frauds. Thus it should be better able to keep pace with 
developing technology.’31  
 
Rights to corporeal money are in rem rights in the traditional Roman sense of the term. A 
right in rem is a right in or against a thing. It is generally enforceable against all persons, 
securing its holder freedom from interference by others of the thing concerned. In the 
case of corporeal money, the thing (or res) will either be banknotes or coins. The 
advantage of such a right is that it is enforceable against (almost) all comers. Provided 
the thing can be located, the law will generally permit its recovery or at least recovery of 
its value. The insolvency of its current holder is thus of no concern to the true owner. 
Rights to incorporeal money, on the other hand, are classical in personam rights. A right 
in personam is a right against a person (or specified persons). Bank money, being simply 
a particular species of debt, is in legal terms a right to repayment from the particular 
bank. As the right does not relate to a tangible thing, it is pointless to attempt to locate 
that thing. Corporeal money deposited with HSBC may be subsequently located in the 
vaults of Barclays Bank but the actual location of the corporeal money is irrelevant 
because a deposit involves a transfer of the right in rem of the depositor to the coins or 
banknotes to HSBC in return for a corresponding promise to repay (typically with 
                                                        
29 Stuart v Kingston (1923) 32 CLR 309, 359. 
30 Chapter 35. 
31 The Law Commission Report on Fraud 2002 (Law Comm 276), 3. 
interest) on the part of HSBC. If HSBC becomes insolvent, the depositor cannot demand 
repayment by Barclays Bank. At first glance, it may appear that a right in rem is obviously 
superior to a right in personam since it is enforceable against multiple parties rather than 
a single (or limited) party(ies). However, careful reflection reveals that exchanging one 
form of right for another involves exchanging one form of risk for another. While an in 
rem right may indeed be almost universally enforceable, one needs to locate the thing 
itself (or at least demonstrate that a particular defendant had indeed interfered with the 
thing) before an action can be brought. If you cannot identify the thief of your coins or 
banknotes, your right to sue the thief is largely theoretical. Provided the debtor is solvent, 
an in personam right frees the holder of the right from concerns over the theft or 
destruction of any particular thing since the right does not relate to any particular thing.32 
Therefore, risk is inevitable though its form will differ depending on the nature of the 
right. 
 
3. ‘DIGITAL MONEY’ BEFORE BITCOINS 
 
It may come as a shock to economists, technologists, businessmen and consumers but 
there is no such thing as digital money as a matter of law. At least that was almost 
certainly true before the invention of cryptocurrencies. References to digital money, so 
far as legal rights are concerned, represent sloppy thinking and a failure to distinguish 
the legal right held by holders of such money from the manner in which they were 
recorded. The distinction is crucially important to our understanding of the risks involved 
in holding both bank money as well as earlier iterations of digital money. It is useful to 
begin our analysis with bank money because the legal analysis of bank money is clearer. 
                                                        
32 Despite s 4(1) of the Theft Act 1968 defines property broadly as including “money and 
all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible 
property”, it remains a matter of some controversy whether an in personam right itself 
should be regarded as capable of being the subject-matter of theft. See, for example, A P 
Simester and G R Sullivan, ‘On the Nature and Rationale of Property Offences’, in R A Duff 
and Stuart P Green, Defining Crimes: Essays on the Special Part of the Criminal Law (2005), 
168. Contra Sarah Green, ‘Conversion and Theft – Tangibly Different?’ (2012) 128 LQR 
564. 
Today, electronic banking allows us to view our bank balances digitally over the Internet. 
Yet the fundamental legal nature of bank money has not changed from the early days of 
banking when ledger entries were made in ink on paper, whether by hand on vellum or 
by printing on a passbook. Just as a ledger entry on paper did not, except in the case of 
banknotes,33 transform bank money render the incorporeal corporeal, neither does a 
digital entry render it digital. This is an easy mistake to make, for both lawyers and non-
lawyers. In Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd,34 for example, EU carbon 
credits (technically European Union Allowances or EUAs) recorded in electronic 
registries were regarded by the trial judge as existing ‘only in electronic form.’ This, one 
of us has observed, is ‘not strictly accurate’ and reflects ‘a failure to distinguish between 
a right and its record’.35 ‘Registration systems serve as records of rights. They do not 
represent the rights themselves.’36 Thus, in the context of carbon credits, it is not the 
carbon credits but their ‘inconclusive record that exists in electronic form.’37 The carbon 
credits themselves were, like bank money, entirely without form. From the perspective 
of risk, this distinction is crucial. Where there has been an unauthorised transfer out of a 
customer’s account, and the account is adjusted to reflect the unauthorised transfer, ‘[t]he 
basic answer in English law is that, in the absence of fraud, the customer is not precluded 
by the bank statement or the pass-book from disputing an error or an incorrect debit 
made by the bank or from insisting upon its correction.’38 If such errors stem from fraud, 
provided they are detected quickly, before money is withdrawn, reversing such transfers 
is often simply an exercise in reversing a data entry.  
                                                        
33 The nature of banknotes in their original form is complicated and would be distracting for our 
purposes. They fall within a category of property called ‘documentary intangibles’, a name that 
reveals the tensions and contradictions within this concept. 
34 [2013] Ch 156, [49]. 
35  Kelvin F K Low and Jolene Lin, ‘Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, 
TragiCO2medy?’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 377, 391. 
36  Kelvin F K Low and Jolene Lin, ‘Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, 
TragiCO2medy?’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 377, 391. 
37  Kelvin F K Low and Jolene Lin, ‘Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, 
TragiCO2medy?’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 377, 391. 
38 EP Ellinger, E Lomnicka and CVM Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 
236. 
 Consider the recent Bangladesh Central Bank cyber-heist. On 4 February 2016, unknown 
hackers used the SWIFT credentials of employees of the Bangladesh Central Bank to send 
transfer requests to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York requiring the latter to transfer 
millions of the Bangladesh Bank’s money to bank accounts in, inter alia, the Philippines 
and Sri Lanka. In this way, $81m was transferred to Rizal Commercial Banking 
Corporation in the Philippines and $20m was transferred to Pan Asia Banking 
Corporation in Sri Lanka. It is necessary to explain how such money ‘transfers’ work in 
legal terms before delving further into the facts of the cyber-heist. As Fox explains, ‘[t]he 
explanation of how property in incorporeal money is transferred has very little to do with 
the law governing the transfer of chattels by delivery. Far more relevant are the principles 
of the law of contract and agency, and the enforcement of title to choses in action.’39 There 
is in truth no ‘transfer’ of property, only a transfer of value:40 
The chose in action representing the money transferred to the recipient’s bank 
account is a distinct item of property from the chose in action representing the 
funds which were originally in the payer’s account. The payer’s title to the money is 
not strictly transferred. Instead, the title to the value represented in the transfer 
passes to the recipient because the payer’s bank extinguishes (wholly or partially) 
the debt which it owes the payer, and the recipient’s bank creates a new debt owed 
by itself to the recipient. 
 
Unlike a transfer of corporeal money, which involves the simultaneous extinction of the 
transferor’s rights to the banknotes or coins and the vesting of the transferee’s rights to 
the same, ‘transfers’ of incorporeal bank money involves no such simultaneous vesting 
and extinction. 41  The time when the transferee acquires irrevocable rights to the 
                                                        
39 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 165. 
40 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 165. 
41 ‘A payment instruction may become irrevocable before the point is reached where a payment 
to the beneficiary becomes complete. There may be a hiatus during which neither the originator 
nor the beneficiary has a complete title to the money which is being transferred between them. 
This marks a significant difference from payments made by the physical delivery of corporeal 
money where the transfer of title from the payer and to the recipient happens simultaneously. It 
is a consequence of the fact that a payment of incorporeal money is always made through a bank 
transferred sum, in the form of a debt owing by its bank, is dependent on the terms of its 
contract with its bank and the rules of banking practice governing the particular 
transfer.42 It is clear, however, that this is neither the time its bank receives the payment 
instruction, the time its bank receives the funds transferred (typically in the form of 
incorporeal money it holds with a correspondent bank), nor the time a credit entry is 
made in the bank’s ledger for the transferee’s account.43 The only way to be absolutely 
sure of a secure receipt is for the transferee to withdraw the funds transferred. The timing 
of the Bangladesh heist appears to have been chosen carefully to take advantage of the 
weekend when no one at the New York Fed was available to respond to attempts by the 
Bangladesh Bank to halt the transfer orders,44 probably in the hopes that this will permit 
the hackers sufficient time to withdraw the funds from the accounts to which they had 
been transferred. This was true of the transfers to Rizal Commercial Banking 
Corporation.45 However, the transfer to Pan Asia Banking Corporation, though receiving 
far less media attention, is more instructive for our purposes. Although the transfer had 
already been cleared by the Fed, the recipient bank had not released the funds to the 
                                                        
acting as intermediary between the parties to the payment transaction, and of the distinct identity 
of the choses in action by which the money is represented.’: David Fox, Property Rights in Money 
(2008), 185. 
42 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 180. 
43 David Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008), 181-183. 
44 Kim Zetter (17 May 2016), That Insane, $81m Bangladesh Bank Heist? Here’s What We Know, 
The Wired (https://www.wired.com/2016/05/insane-81m-bangladesh-bank-heist-heres-
know/)  
45 ‘It turns out that the four-day lapse before the fraud was uncovered was plenty of time for $81 
million to be transferred from the Bangladesh Bank account at the New York Fed to Wells Fargo 
Mellon Bank, Citibank, and Bank of New York, to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation’s 
Settlement Division, to bank accounts for a Chinese businessman at a local branch at RCBC, and 
then on to casinos in the Philippines’: Chelsea Allison (2 June 2016), Anatomy of a Bank Heist, Fin 
(https://fin.plaid.com/articles/anatomy-of-a-bank-heist). It should be noted that even so, of the 
$81m,  some $68,305 funds that had not been withdrawn were eventually put on hold: Arun 
Devnath (16 March 2016), Printer Error Triggered Bangladesh Race to Halt Cyber Heist, 
Bloomberg News (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-16/printer-error-set-
off-bangladesh-race-to-halt-illicit-transfers)  
account holder and so the transfer could simply be, and was indeed, reversed once the 
fraud was clearly established. In this case, it appears that Pan Asia Banking Corporation 
had contacted its routing counterpart, Deutsche Bank, because, according to an official,46 
‘[t]he transaction was too large for a country like [ours]’. Upon checking, Deutsche Bank 
‘came back and said it was a suspect transaction.’ This was because the request had 
misspelt the recipient’s name as Shalika Fandation instead of Shalika Foundation. Thus, 
‘the typo was caught in time to freeze the funds, which were returned to Bangladesh 
Bank’s account in New York via Deutsche Bank on Feb 17.’ 47  In legal terms, the 
Bangladesh Central Bank’s statement of accounts with the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York was corrected to reflect the wrongly debited $20m.  
 
Even in respect of money that has been withdrawn by the transferee, the loss does not 
necessarily fall on the account holder because the statement of accounts is not 
authoritative and normally, barring contractual terms to the contrary, losses stemming 
from any unauthorised ‘transfers’ fall on the bank rather than its customers. The contract 
between the bank and the customer may attempt to shift these losses onto customers. In 
some jurisdictions, such as Canada, this has taken the form of the practice of inserting 
verification clauses into their contracts with customers. Such clauses would ‘impose on 
the customer a duty to peruse his account statements promptly and to notify the bank of 
any errors or irregularities within a specified time. Failure so to notify the bank should 
be deemed to constitute a verification by the customer of the balance struck’48 However, 
as Ross Anderson, Professor of Security Engineering at the Computer Laboratory at the 
University of Cambridge observed, ‘Since the late 1990s the move to phone banking and 
then the internet has led to contract terms and conditions along the lines of “You agree to 
be liable for any transactions which, according to our records, were made using your 
                                                        
46 Serajul Quadir (10 March 2016), How a Hacker’s Typo Helped Stop a Billion Dollar Bank Heist, 
Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-bangladesh-typo-insight-
idUSKCN0WC0TC)  
47  Chelsea Allison (2 June 2016), Anatomy of a Bank Heist, Fin 
(https://fin.plaid.com/articles/anatomy-of-a-bank-heist)  
48 EP Ellinger, E Lomnicka and CVM Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 
240-1. 
password, whether you actually made them or not”.’49 Drafted in extremely broad and 
all-encompassing terms, it should be observed that such clauses are subject to statutory 
control. Although directed towards verification clauses, the following statement applies 
equally to clauses that purport to transfer liability for unauthorised online transactions 
onto customers:50  
Where the bank’s customer is a consumer, or a non-consumer dealing on the bank’s 
written standard terms of business, [such clauses] run the risk of being held 
unreasonable and, therefore, ineffective under the [Unfair Contract Terms Act] 
1977. Under section 13(1)(c) of UCTA 1977, clauses that exclude or restrict rules of 
evidence or procedure are treated in the same way as those that exclude or restrict 
liability. Where the customer is a consumer, the clauses is also at risk of being held 
to be unfair and, therefore, unenforceable under the [Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations] 1999. Schedule 2, paragraph 1(q) of the Regulations 
indicates that a term may be unfair where it has the object and effect of unduly 
restricting the evidence available to a customer against his bank or imposes a 
burden of proof on the customer that should, by law, be on the bank. 
Clauses that are as widely drafted as those referred to by Professor Anderson are unlikely 
to survive judicial scrutiny and it is likely that banks will shoulder the losses rather than 
pass them onto customers if litigation is simply threatened unless the sums involved are 
large and/or it is able to demonstrate gross negligence on the part of their customers. 
First, banks make substantial savings through internet banking and if customers stopped 
using these services because they feel that the system cannot be trusted, these savings 
                                                        
49 Miles Brignall (21 November 2015), So You Think You’re Safe Doing Internet Banking?, The 
Guardian (https://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/nov/21/safe-internet-banking-cyber-
security-online). See also Ingolf Becker et al, ‘International Comparison of Bank Fraud 
Reimbursement: Customer Perceptions and Contractual Terms’, Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security (WEIS), 13-14 June 2016, Berkeley, CA, USA. 
50 EP Ellinger, E Lomnicka and CVM Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 
243. See also Nicholas Bohm et al, ‘Electronic Commerce: Who Carries the Risk of Fraud?’ (2000) 
3 Journal of Information, Law and Technology 
(https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/bohm/)  
would be lost.51 Secondly, litigation, as already observed, is likely to lead to such clauses 
being pronounced ineffectual, especially since they seem to contradict the standards set 
out in the ‘Banking: Conduct of Business Sourcebook’ issued by the Financial Conduct 
Authority.52 
 
Consider then the precursors of Bitcoin that are not bank money. In the early nineties, a 
product called DigiCash was launched which openly touted itself as digital money. 53 
There were two problems with the product, one of which proved fatal. As its inventor, 
David Chaum, observed, ‘It was hard to get enough merchants to accept it, so that you 
could get enough consumers to use it, or vice versa’.54 This practical problem resulted in 
DigiCash Inc, the company, being declared bankrupt in 1998. However, it is the lesser of 
the two problems that interest us. Digital money, it turns out, is not money in digital form 
after all. Rather, similarly to bank money recorded digitally, digital money (sometimes 
also called electronic money) is an in personam claim on the issuer (chose in action) that 
is stored digitally (or electronically, including magnetically).55 While the accounts may be 
recorded digitally and may perhaps be more secure (one of the vaunted attributes of 
DigiCash was its use of cryptography to secure the records) than banks’ statements of 
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accounts, such digital money, if it is even legally money at all, is completely incorporeal 
as a matter of law. The records may take on a digital form. The right itself has no form 
whatsoever. It therefore exposes holders to the same sort of risks as bank money – 
primarily the insolvency of the issuer. Where the issuer is regulated under the Electronic 
Money Regulations 2011, 56  this risk is diminished (though not eliminated) through 
regulations such as the imposition of capital requirements.57 Regulated electronic money 
is always ‘redeemable’ and is thus best construed as debts against the issuer (much like 
bank money). The rights conferred by issuers to holders of non-regulated electronic 
money will vary depending on the terms of the contract but they likely remain in 
personam claims against their issuers, though the claim may not take the form of a debt 
(ie a claim for a sum of money). It may instead be a claim for services of a certain 
monetary value but the claim is always an in personam against the issuer. As such, it will 
always expose holders to the insolvency risk of the issuer. We posit therefore that the risk 
of ‘theft’ through hacking is likely to treated similarly to hacks of bank accounts. 
 
While there are some suggestions in the literature which attempt to assign proprietary 
or quasi-proprietary status to the electronic token that represents the value of the 
electronic money,58 all such accounts nonetheless resort to a personal obligation against 
the issuer as the means by which such electronic money attains its commercial value. 
Furthermore, all accounts that seek to reify (ie reduce to the nature of a thing) the 
electronic token, as opposed to treating it merely as a record of a right (as we have 
suggested), have failed to properly account for how such electronic tokens are 
transferred nor have they explained the nature of their legal protection in any detail. Such 
accounts are analogous to the original form which banknotes (sometimes privately 
issued) took where the value in the banknotes lies in the obligation of their issuers to pay 
an equivalent value in fiat currency (or coins in the case of banknotes issued by Central 
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Banks). However, the analogy breaks down because for banknotes, as promissory notes, 
the in personam obligation was reduced to corporeal form and the banknotes were 
essentially protected and transferred similarly to other corporeal property. Electronic 
tokens, on the other hand, are fundamentally distinct and incorporeal. In the first place, 
it is not clear if they are capable of transfer in the property law sense of the word. When 
we speak of transferring digital files, for example, the process is distinct from that of 
delivery of a corporeal thing by one person to another. Rather, the ‘transfer’ process 
involves the creation of a copy in a new medium before the ‘original’ copy is deleted in 
the original medium. This process simulates, but is not identical to, a transfer properly 
so-called. 59  Likewise, there is no account of what forms of interferences ‘holders’ of 
electronic tokens will be protected from as a matter of law since a basic understanding of 
property law reveals that the owner of any property is not always entitled to protection 
from all forms of unwelcome activity. A landowner, for example, cannot complain of 
neighbours looking over into their land because there is no such thing as visual trespass.60 
Finally, even if correct, treating such electronic tokens as electronic embodiments of 
incorporeal in personam rights simply exposes ‘holders’ of such tokens to both the risk of 
loss/destruction and the risk of their issuer’s insolvency since all issuers to date have 
been private issuers rather than State issuers. 
 
4. BITCOINS: A PRIMER 
 
In his/her/their white paper, Nakamoto describes a cryptographic system for ‘electronic 
cash’ in which payment transactions are verified on the basis of group consensus rather 
than through financial institutions serving as trusted third parties. According to 
Nakamoto, the inherent weakness of a trust based model was that transactions are not 
completely non-reversible. As such, financial institutions cannot avoid mediating 
disputes which ‘increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction 
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size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions.’ 61   If payment 
transactions are reversible, it also entails merchants undertaking the risk of non-
performance on the part of their counterparties since apparent payments can be 
subsequently rescinded. Bitcoin was envisaged as ‘an electronic payment system based 
on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact 
directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party.’62 As a result of the 
central role played by cryptography in the system, bitcoin and its derivatives are known 
as cryptocurrencies. Once properly validated, bitcoin transactions are irreversible.63 
 
Unlike DigiCash, the absence of an issuer or trusted third party means that bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrencies cannot be regarded as an in personam claim on an issuer and so 
must be analysed differently from bank money and earlier forms of digital money. It also 
obviously differs in nature from corporeal money in the form of banknotes and coins 
since there is no corporeal thing (res) for any legal right to relate to. If legal protection in 
the form of property rights attach to bitcoins, it is likely to be in the form of universal 
abstract rights akin to intellectual property, which do not neatly fall into either Roman 
classification.64 It is not entirely clear what, if any legal rights, attach to bitcoins and other 
private cryptocurrencies like bitcoin. It has thus been argued that ‘[t]here is … a good 
policy reason for the conclusion that one cannot, in a private law sense, “own” bitcoin.’65 
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Among cryptocurrency enthusiasts, a not insignificant segment subscribe to the idea of 
immutability, even in the face of demonstrable fraud, as if it were some sort of code of 
law. This can be seen in the aftermath of a hack of a curious ‘fund’ called the DAO (or 
Decentralized Autonomous Organization). Set up as an investment fund which would 
allow all the investors to have a say in the investments made (as opposed to fund 
managers),66 the DAO attracted more than US$168m worth of a cryptocurrency called 
Ether.67 Unfortunately, on 17 June 2016, a hacker managed to siphon off some US$50m 
worth of the invested Ether.68 The hack tested the immutability of the Ethereum ledger. 
The core developers of Ethereum eventually decided on a hard fork of the ledger, in effect 
a sort of reset that rolled back the entire Ethereum network to its state before the hack.69 
The hard fork was approved by 97% of the Ethereum network.70 This in effect created 
two versions of the ledger. The original intent of the developers (and those voting for the 
hard fork) was for the compromised ledger to wither away, the original compromised 
ledger refused to go away.71 The survival of this zombie chain that refuses to die, now 
styled as Ethereum Classic to distinguish it from the hard forked Ethereum which is now 
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called Ethereum One, demonstrates that there is a significant segment of the 
cryptocurrency community who ‘would like to see a strict adherence to the original 
concept of code as law.’72 
 
5. CRYPTOCURRENCY RISKS 
 
Professor Eugene Howard Spafford, a leading computer security expert, was once quoted 
as saying, ‘The only truly secure system is one that is powered off, cast in a block of 
concrete and sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards – and even then I have my 
doubts.’ 73  A cryptocurrency network is vulnerable at several levels. Some of these 
vulnerabilities are theoretical but many have in fact been exploited in practice. At the 
personal level, a person’s private cryptographic key can be ‘stolen’. If it is stored 
electronically on his personal computer or mobile device, this ‘theft’ or hack can be 
achieved using malicious e-mail attachments or applications or by using keystroke 
logging devices or software to trace the private cryptographic key as it is typed in. Even 
if the private cryptographic key is not stored electronically but offline, for example using 
a so-called paper wallet, access to the private cryptographic key will still allow a ‘thief’ to 
make off with one’s bitcoins, as happened to the CEO of a financial services company who 
left his account information in his car while having it valet parked.74 At the exchange level, 
security loopholes may allow hackers to gain access to an exchange’s hot wallet. The most 
famous case of such a hack is that of Mt Gox, one of the earliest and biggest bitcoin 
exchanges where US$460 million worth of bitcoins were apparently ‘stolen’ by hackers.75 
More recently, roughly US$72 million worth of bitcoins were ‘stolen’ by hackers from 
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Bitfinex, an exchange based in Hong Kong. At least, they were worth US$72 million before 
the hack. The price of bitcoins plunged on news of the hack.76 There are also security 
flaws at the network level though the threat here has mostly remained theoretical. 
Technically, if a person or more likely group of persons gains control of more than 50% 
of the total network hash power of the bitcoin network, they can invalidate transactions 
and/or double spend bitcoins from their own bitcoin addresses. Such an attack is unlikely 
to occur for a number of reasons. First, it is extremely expensive to amass sufficient 
computing power to launch such an attack. Secondly, such an attack will lead to 
widespread reluctance to accept bitcoins as payment, causing its value to plummet; a 
counterproductive effect for persons controlling sufficient nodes to launch such an attack 
as they are likely to hold a lot of bitcoins.77 However, coding vulnerabilities in ‘smart’ 
contracts78 that employ cryptocurrencies could also expose holders of cryptocurrencies 
to hacks such as that carried out against the DAO. It appears that the vaunted security of 
cryptocurrencies, through the use of cryptography, is limited to ‘preventing double 
spending attacks or the forging of coins.’ 79  This is confirmed on a careful reading of 
Satoshi Nakamoto’s White Paper, the object of which was to ‘propose a solution to the 
double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate 
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computational proof of the chronological order of transactions.’ 80  The cryptographic 
protocols of the blockchain only promise to prevent double-spending. They provide zero 
protection from other forms of fraud, such as hacking, which is not only possible but 
commonplace. As the Financial Times reported, ‘[o]nline lists curated by bitcoin 
community members suggest bitcoin exchanges have been involved in up to 60 high-
profile hacking incidents since the digital asset class was created in 2009. The true scale 
of the hacking problem, however, is hard to estimate.’81 This is despite bitcoin’s (and 
other cryptocurrencies) current miniscule scale in terms of transaction volume as 
compared to other payment services.82 More generally, it has been observed that, ‘[o]n 
an almost daily basis it seems major companies with whom citizens share their precious 
financial data and identities have been hit by external and internal attackers. Many have 
simply not had adequate basic protection measures in place; others have been caught 
short by the ever-changing inventiveness of hackers with which they cannot keep pace.’83 
Thus, ‘while antivirus software preciously detected most malware, it now detects only a 
minority of it.’84 Online crime, leading computer security experts say, ‘has taken off as a 
serious industry since about 2004.’85 According to these experts:86 
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In the old days, electronic fraud was largely a cottage industry, local and inefficient: 
a typical card fraudster ran a vertically-integrated small business. For example, he 
might buy a card-encoding machine, get a job in a shop where he could copy 
customers’ cards, and then go out at night to steal cash from automatic teller 
machines (ATMs). … 
But now criminal networks have emerged – online black markets in which the bad 
guys trade with each other, with criminals taking on specialized roles (Thomas and 
Martin, 2006). Just as in Adam Smith’s pin factory, specialization has led to 
impressive productivity gains, even though the subject is now bank card PINs rather 
than metal ones. [S]omeone who can collect bank card and PIN data or electronic 
banking passwords can sell them online to anonymous brokers at advertised rates 
of $0.40-$20.00 per card and $10-$100 per bank account (Symantec, 2008). The 
information needed to apply for credit in someone else’s name, such as name, social 
security number, and birthday, fetches $1 to $15 per set. The brokers in turn sell 
the credentials to specialist cashiers who steal and then launder the money. 
The Anti-Phishing Working Group, in its latest quarterly report, notes that the number of 
unique phishing websites detected per month rose from 48,114 in October 2015 to 
123,555 in March 2016, a 250% increase over 6 months; the number of unique phishing 
e-mail reports increased from 99,384 in January 2016 to 229,265 in March 2016; and that 
there is an average of 227,000 new malware samples per day in the 4th Quarter of 2015, 
rising from an average of 225,000 per day a year ago.87 While these statistics should be 
taken with a pinch of salt, as some members of the group have a vested interest in 
exaggerating the scale of the problem,88 there is a distinct upward trend in cases of online 
fraud and even experts alive to the difficulties with statistics from the security industry 
acknowledge that the frauds are increasing in sophistication.89 Fraudsters, it appears, are 
endlessly inventive. No system is immune from fraud. Often, they will target the weakest 
link in a system. As computer security expert, Bruce Schneier once remarked, ‘Only 
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amateurs attack machines; professionals target people.’90 In the case of bitcoins and other 
cryptocurrencies, running off blockchain technology, the weakest link will often be the 
end users (including cryptocurrency exchanges) rather than the integrity of their ledgers, 
which appear to remain largely secure. In 2014, Ciaran Martin, the Director General for 
Cyber Security at GCHQ observed that, apart from the threat from cybercrime, cyber risk 
in the financial sector can also arise from terrorism, a major conflict between states that 
draws in the UK, and a major accident or natural event.91 Presumably, such attacks are 
aimed not so much at financial gain but at destabilising the economy of the victim state. 
If holders of cryptocurrencies (fiat or otherwise) are not protected from hacking, then 
any economy that is dependent on such cryptocurrencies (presumably greater in the case 
of fiat cryptocurrencies) will be vulnerable to such exceptional attacks. 
 
The increasing concern over cybercrime stands in marked contrast to the ‘[m]arked 
reductions [that] have been seen in property crime since peak levels in the 1990s’.92 Some 
of the theories on why property crime has fallen include ‘significant improvements in 
forensic and other crime scene investigation techniques and record keeping, such as 
fingerprinting and DNA testing’ as well as ‘changes (real or perceived) in technology such 
as CCTV’, both of which may have a deterrent effect as they are perceived to increase the 
likelihood of conviction. 93  By contrast, cyber criminals are, at least presently, at an 
advantage compared to the law enforcement agencies. ‘[O]nline crime usually crosses 
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national boundaries. Existing mechanisms for international police cooperation are 
expensive and slow – designed to catch the occasional fugitive murderer, but not for 
dealing with millions of frauds at a cost of a few hundred dollars each.’94 Furthermore, 
whereas ‘conventional crime is generally committed by marginal members of society’, 
cyber criminals ‘tend to be educated and capable, but they live in societies with poor job 
prospects and ineffective policing.’95 Cybercrime, as with so much activity related to the 
Internet, is perceived by the criminals as being relatively anonymous.96 It has even been 
suggested that another barrier to deterrence lies in ‘the inability of key stakeholders in 
criminal justice systems to grasp fundamental aspects of technology aided crime.’97 Thus, 
although reports of serious cybercrime are escalating, there has not been a corresponding 
increase in conviction rates, ‘with many investigations and prosecutions failing to get off 
the ground’.98 
 
It is against this factual backdrop that we must examine the legal risk that follows from 
holding cryptocurrency. The Bitfinex hack is instructive in terms of our study. As a lawyer 
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explained to the Financial Times, ‘With Bitfinex, user wallets were segregated. As a result, 
the relationship was seemingly more custodial in nature. In other words, the hack 
resulted in the theft of users’ property’.99 This particular Financial Times report is equal 
parts tantalising and frustrating. It drew an analogy to a thief stealing contents from 
users’ safety deposit boxes rather than the contents of their bank accounts. Quoting the 
same unnamed lawyer, the report added, ‘[t]his matters because in the bank account 
situation, losses are necessarily socialised whereas socialising deposit box losses would 
be theft’. Whilst the result is mostly correct (losses are not always socialised)100 if indeed 
the ‘stolen’ bitcoins were held on trust,101 it fails to explain why the legal analysis would 
lead to a different result than the ‘theft’ of bank money from an ordinary bank account. A 
custodial relationship, in common law jurisdictions, would either take the form of a 
bailment or a trust. In the case of cryptocurrencies, which are incorporeal property if they 
are property at all, it would seem that this relationship cannot be explained as a 
bailment,102  which leaves the trust analysis. If trust property is ‘stolen’, then it is its 
beneficial owner that bears the loss, subject to possible claims against the trustee for 
breach of duty (in this case, a duty of care). The reason why money ‘stolen’ from a bank 
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account is not treated this way is because, as we have seen, the statement of accounts 
does not represent the legal rights of the bank customers (or any rights at all). It is merely 
an imperfect record of the customers’ rights. It is only upon withdrawal of the ‘stolen’ 
money that a cyber-theft is effective and the money so withdrawn belongs not to the 
customer but the bank. When a customer deposits money (in whatever form) with a bank, 
any legal rights to that money is transferred to the bank in exchange for an in personam 
claim against the bank. Account holders thus do not hold any property rights to any 
particular assets belonging to the bank. Rather, they all have in personam claims (debt 
claims) against the bank (reflected as its liabilities, not assets). As they do not hold any 
particular assets in the bank, nothing can be stolen from them in the conventional sense 
of the word.  
 
Consider a bank with four customers: Alan, Beatrice, Charles and Diana. Just as Alan’s 
account with the bank is merely a debt claim against it, the same is true of Beatrice, 
Charles and Diana. These accounts represent liabilities owing by the bank; they do not 
represent claims on any particular assets belonging to the bank. Hence, the bank is free 
to use the £50 deposited by Diana to repay Alan if his account has been hacked. This is 
because, upon deposit, the £50 belongs to the bank, not Diana. It is for this reason that 
banks may (not must or will) socialise losses among account holders. It may not do so in 
two circumstances. First, depending on the terms of its banking contract and the 
circumstances surrounding a particular hack, a bank may try to transfer the loss to the 
particular customer, perhaps on the grounds of the customer’s gross negligence. 
Secondly, provided its assets still exceed its liabilities, there is simply no cause to 
‘socialise’ the loss. It is only in the event that the bank is insolvent and unable/unwilling 
to transfer the loss to the particular affected customer that the loss is ‘socialised’ or 
‘shared’ with unaffected customers. This ‘socialisation’ of loss is in effect the flipside of 
not having any legal interest in an asset belonging to the bank which can be stolen. While 
no particular asset held by the bank belongs to the customer, the customer runs the risk 
that the bank may become insolvent. While the risk of insolvency is minimised through 
banking regulation, including inter alia, reserve ratios or capital requirements and 
deposit insurance,103 it is not and cannot be eliminated.104 Where an exchange ‘holds’ 
bitcoins for its customers in the way that a bank holds money for its account holders, the 
bitcoin holders are exposing themselves to the insolvency risks of the exchange.  
Interestingly, by preferring to socialise the losses, Bitfinex appears to have taken the view 
that this is the legal arrangement they had with their customers, contrary to the 
assessment of the lawyer quoted in the Financial Times.105 Where, however, an exchange 
holds bitcoins in a custodial capacity, the bitcoin holders exchange the insolvency risk of 
the exchange for risk of loss/destruction of their bitcoins. If the exchange were to become 
insolvent, they can simply ‘withdraw’ their bitcoins without suffering any loss. 
Nevertheless, as we have already observed, it is not true that a customer of Bitfinex is 
entirely without remedy against Bitfinex even if their bitcoins were held on trust rather 
than simply owed to them. If it can be demonstrated that Bitfinex was negligent in its 
custody of the relevant bitcoins, it will be liable to its customers who suffered a loss 
through the hack. Whether it will have sufficient assets to reimburse these customers is, 
of course, an entirely different matter. This is because it must be recalled that if a trust 
analysis is correct, most if not all of the other bitcoins it holds will also likely belong 
beneficially to its other customers (whose wallets were not hacked). A direct holder of 
cryptocurrencies would be in a similar position to an account holder at Bitfinex whose 
account has been hacked. Indeed, this holder would be even more vulnerable (legally as 
a matter of risk) because there would simply be no entity at all to pursue a negligence 
claim against. If the loss was the result of carelessness, it was the holder’s own 
carelessness. 
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For such direct holders of cryptocurrencies, there are nevertheless a number of parties 
that it may wish to pursue, provided they can be identified. First, it is likely that any hack 
would involve acquiring the holder’s private key. This would expose the hacker, provided 
he/she/they can be identified, to a claim for breach of confidence. Secondly, they may 
wish to trace their stolen bitcoins or other cryptocurrency in the hopes of recovering 
them or at least their value. With the passage of time, this party is unlikely to be the 
hacker. Whether this can be done will depend in part on the cryptocurrency concerned 
and in part on how the law chooses to respond to cryptocurrency as property. The 
traceability of subsequent holders of cryptocurrency will depend on the anonymity 
protocols of the particular cryptocurrency. Bitcoin, it should be remembered, is not 
completely anonymous but only pseudo-anonymous. While the identity of the address 
holder is not known, all transactions related to the address are in fact transparent and 
tracked in the blockchain. With the appropriate information, including publicly available 
information, it is possible to track some bitcoin transactions.106 It has been estimated that 
‘almost 40% of users can be, to a large extent, recovered even when users adopt privacy 
measures recommended by Bitcoin.’107 Some cryptocurrencies, such as darkcoin,108 are 
designed to offer far greater anonymity than bitcoin. This will make tracking ‘stolen’ 
darkcoins far more difficult than tracking ‘stolen’ bitcoins. Even assuming they are 
successfully tracked, holders face great uncertainty in terms of the protection that the law 
will afford them. At one extreme, though we consider this unlikely, especially if 
cryptocurrencies achieve mainstream adoption, the law may adopt the attitude of the 
adherents to Ethereum Classic. In other words, the code is law and immutability means 
immutability. There is no known property law regime that operates in this fashion – to a 
property lawyer, this is indefeasibility on steroids. At the other extreme, the common law 
courts could apply the principle of nemo dat quod non habet109 strictly so that subsequent 
                                                        
106 Andy Greenberg (29 January 2015), “Prosecutors Trace $13.4m in Bitcoins from the Silk Road 
to Ulbricht’s Laptop”, Wired. 
107  Elli Androulaki, Ghassan O. Karame, Marc Roeschlin, Tobias Scherer, and Srdjan Capkun, 
“Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin” in Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (ed), Financial Cryptography and 
Data Security (2013), 34.  
108 Andy Greenberg (21 May 2014), “Darkcoin, the Shadowy Cousin of Bitcoin, is Booming”, Wired. 
109 No one gives what he does not have. 
holders of the ‘stolen’ cryptocurrencies are liable to their ‘true owners’ for their value in 
an action emulating the tort of conversion that exists for corporeal money, regardless of 
whether they are bona fide purchasers of the same. This is possible because the key 
attribute of money in the legal system is its attribute of currency. This involves ‘the 
creation of a fresh indefeasible title in a person who receives money as a bona fide 
purchaser for value.’110 By tempering the harsh nemo dat rule with such a robust defence, 
the law indirectly supports the economic function of money as a medium of exchange.111 
Its applicability to cryptocurrencies may be doubted, and thus the harsh nemo dat rule 
may be applied in full (at least in some instances), for two reasons. First, ‘the question 
whether the law should treat a certain kind of asset as money … can only be answered by 
observing whether the community where it circulates treats it as such.’112 It is far from 
clear that bitcoin, to say nothing of all its competing cryptocurrencies, has come to be 
generally acceptable as a medium of exchange. Secondly, even where a particular class of 
asset has acquired the attribute of currency, the bona fide purchase rule ‘would not apply 
when money was transferred as a specific good or as a commodity’.113 Thus, in Moss v 
Hancock, a second-hand jewellery shop bought a stolen five-pound gold piece for five 
sovereigns. In determining whether the shop was liable to restore the coin, the court 
rejected the shop’s invocation of the bona fide purchase defence because the gold piece 
had been sold to the shop as a dealer in curios rather than paid as money for goods or 
services. A significant segment of the cryptocurrency community treats bitcoins and 
similar cryptocurrencies as investments rather than as a medium of exchange. This 
explains in part the Chinese dominance of bitcoin computing power. As Bobby Lee, chief 
executive of BTCC, explained to The New York Times, ‘For one thing, the Chinese 
government had strictly limited other potential investment avenues, giving citizens a 
hunger for new assets. Also, … the Chinese loved the volatile price of Bitcoin, which gave 
the fledgling currency network the feeling of online gambling, a very popular activity in 
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China.’114 Such cryptocurrency investors may find that, even if some cryptocurrencies 
achieve the legal status of currency, they may not take advantage of the bona fide 
purchase rule that comes with that status. This means that, for pure investors in bitcoin, 
their investment carries the risk that they become liable to the ‘true owners’ of any 
‘stolen’ bitcoin that they may acquire, even if they did so bona fide at full market price. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
It is early days yet in the development and adoption of cryptocurrencies. While a number 
of central banks have expressed interest in cryptocurrencies, including fiat varieties of 
the same, their suitability for wide adoption and/or eventual replacement of either 
corporeal money or bank money is a matter that deserves closer reflection. Particularly 
disconcerting are the frequency of hacks of cryptocurrency exchanges and the lack of 
information of hacks at the level of individual holders. This is despite the fact that 
cryptocurrencies remain very much a niche product. It is thus difficult to estimate the 
scale of the problem should fiat cryptocurrencies be adopted, or worse mandated, as 
replacement for corporeal money. Presumably, the property status of fiat cryptocurrency 
will not then be in issue since Parliament can simply enact laws to confirm its status. 
However, differing in nature as it does from bank money, which many laypersons also 
regard as digital money, losses stemming from cybercrime in the form of hacking will hit 
individual holders particularly hard whereas hacks of bank accounts are typically borne 
by banks and spread to its other depositors in the form of fees and bank charges. 
Mandatory fiat cryptocurrencies will provide an opportunity for large scale lucrative 
fraud. The risk of loss through ‘ownership’ of what may be the first true form of digital 
money would also be difficult to guard against because unlike theft of corporeal money, 
cyber theft is an unbounded crime and there is no requirement of physical proximity 
between perpetrator and victim. Cybercrime not only removes the need for proximity 
between perpetrator and victim, the nature of the Internet gives perpetrators a far wider 
reach. Whilst there are only so many burglaries a skilled burglar can commit in any given 
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time, automation allows the perpetrator of a cybercrime to reach a significantly greater 
number of victims so that relatively few offenders can reach a very large number of 
victims in a very short amount of time.115 Not only is there likely to be an explosion of 
cyber-theft, considering current trends in cyber-crime,116 it is likely that the elderly are 
likely to be disproportionately exposed to such losses from a switch to cryptocurrency. 
This is unsurprising since they are likely to have the most wealth whilst at the same time 
being among the least tech savvy of all users.117 This means that any central bank which 
is serious about issuing fiat cryptocurrency must consider seriously the problem of 
cybersecurity at the individual user level (a problem that may well prove intractable) or 
instituting some form of insurance for loss through hacking, or both. It must also seriously 
consider phasing in any cryptocurrency whilst maintaining the continued use of coins 
and banknotes, though this will somewhat diminish the appeal of cryptocurrencies as a 
tool for the easy application of negative interest rates as compared to corporeal money.118 
Perhaps even more importantly, the relevant officials looking into developing fiat 
cryptocurrencies should beware the hype surrounding the blockchain technology that 
underpins bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies. While promoters vigorously proclaim the 
security of ledgers operated using the blockchain, they often fail to mention that the 
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blockchain’s system of cryptographic proof is directed exclusively towards the problem of 
double spending. The blockchain technology provides zero protection against any other 
kinds of fraud. In other words, the blockchain protects the network from user fraud but 
does not protect users from other frauds. However, unless such other frauds are suitably 
addressed, presumably through the use of other technological innovations, the issue of 
fiat cryptocurrency must be regarded as extremely foolhardy. In the meantime, the only 
proper advice for persons looking to invest in/use private cryptocurrencies must surely 
be caveat emptor.  
